We use high-frequency intraday interest rate data to measure euro area monetary policy shocks on the days of ECB interest rate announcements between 2002 and 2013. In line with Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , we look at monetary policy shocks along two time dimensions: one related to the current level of short-term interest rates and a second related to expectations for the future path of these rates. We undertake regression analysis in order to determine the impact of monetary policy shocks on euro-denominated financial asset prices and find that shocks related to the future path of monetary policy are an important driver, particularly for longer-term bond yields. We find that this relationship has changed for certain asset classes since the onset of the crisis, notably the sovereign bonds of stressed euro area countries. These findings highlight the changed nature of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in some euro area countries during the sovereign debt crisis.
Introduction
It is by now well established in the academic literature that central bank communication operates along two time dimensions: one related to the current level of short-term interest rates and another related to the expected future path of these rates. 1 Indeed, even before the recent adoption of forward guidance policies, central banks had become explicit about the role of expectations management in their monetary policy strategies.
2 It is also well established, in line with Kuttner (2001) , that monetary policy announcements only matter to financial market participants when they deviate from expectations. While such deviations can be easily measured for the first component of central banks' communication (related to current short-term interest rates), it is less clear how changes to the second component (related to expectations for the future path of short-term rates) should be measured.
In this paper, we investigate different methods of estimating monetary policy shocks in the euro area along these two time dimensions, using data for the period 2002-2013. In line with Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) , we refer to these two components as a jump factor, corresponding to changes in the current level of short-term interest rates, and a path factor, corresponding to changes in the expected future path of short-term interest rates. We examine the impact of these shocks on euro-denominated financial asset prices and analyse whether the onset of the financial market and euro area sovereign debt crises gave rise to a change in these relationships, with a particular emphasis on euro area sovereign bond markets.
In order to undertake this analysis, we construct a new data set of high frequency intraday financial market data using the Thomson Reuters Tick History application. Our database comprises minute-by-minute mid-quote rates for OIS contracts of 16 different maturities (up to 2 years) on all days of ECB monetary policy announcements since January 2002. We use these OIS rates to construct a number of forward OIS rate series across the OIS rate curve. Our data set also contains minute-by-minute data for the sovereign bond yields of the 4 largest euro area countries and for the Eurostoxx 50 index. The use of such high frequency data permits an analysis of changes in interest rates and asset prices over very short time windows, allowing us to better isolate 1 As noted by Blinder et al. (2008) : "the view that monetary policy is, at least in part, about managing expectations is by now standard fare both in academia and in central banking circles". 2 For example, ECB (2008) states: "By using its ability to steer market interest rates at the shortest maturities close to the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem's main refinancing operations and by communicating its strategy and policy intentions in a clear and transparent manner, the ECB can influence money market rates at longer maturities." the impact of monetary policy announcements on market interest rates and other financial assets prices. Such data also allow us to pinpoint the impact of specific statements and announcements such as, for example, the various nonstandard monetary policy measures announced by the ECB since the onset of the financial market crisis.
In line with an important contribution by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , we employ a factor analysis and a factor rotation in order to decompose the change in forward OIS rates in a window around monetary policy announcements into two components, i.e., jump and path factors. We implement this methodology for three periods: our entire sample (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , a "pre-crisis" sub sample (January 2002 -October 2008), and a "post-crisis" sub sample (October 2013 -December 2013). 3 We also undertake a second method (based on Gürkaynak, 2005 ) that employs a series of recursive regressions in order to decompose the changes in forward OIS rates into three factors: jump, timing and path factors. This additional factor relates to uncertainty as to the timing of expected interest rate announcements.
We find that the jump and path factors measured using both methodologies explain a large part of the variation of sovereign bond yields in a window around ECB monetary policy announcements. For example, regression specifications including the 2 factors measured using the first method explain 90% of the variation in French 2-year yields and 59% of the variation in French 10-year yields during our time windows for the period 2002-2013. 4 Furthermore, the explanatory power of our jump and path factors remains quite consistent for French and German yields when we measure them separately for the periods before and after the crisis. However, this is not the case for the yields of Spain and Italy with, for example, our regression specification explaining 63% of the variation in Spanish 10-year yields in the period prior to the financial market crisis and just 11% thereafter. These results highlight the breakdown in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy for such countries during the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, 3 The ECB made two interest rate announcements in October 2008: one scheduled announcement on 2 October and one unscheduled announcement on 8 October. The ECB announced its fixed-rate full allotment policy for liquidity-providing operations on 8 October. As we use this event to split our sample between the pre-and post-crisis periods, we place the 2 October announcement in the pre-crisis sub sample and the 8 October announcement in the post-crisis sub sample. 4 We also include the surprise component of the US Initial Jobless Claims data release in our regression specification. These data are generally released at the same time as the start of the ECB's monetary policy press conference and, therefore, can have an impact on euro area sovereign yields during our time window. As discussed below, we clean our OIS data for the possible impact of the Initial Jobless Claims data on euro area money market rates.
this is the first study (to our knowledge) to undertake a systematic analysis of euro area monetary policy shocks during the period since the onset of the financial market crisis. Other studies, notably Brand, Buncic and Turunen (2010), undertake a similar analysis but do not include the post-2007 crisis period. This allows us to test for differences in the information content of monetary policy announcements before and after the crisis, particularly as the nature of monetary policy shocks may have changed due to the adoption of non-standard monetary policy measures during this period. However, we find that this is not the case, with tests indicating that two factors continue to be sufficient to explain changes in the OIS curve in a window around ECB interest rate announcements. This result is somewhat surprising, given that the ECB announced a number of non-standard monetary policy measures at the same time as interest rate announcements over the course of the crisis. In particular, announcements relating to the provision of liquidity (e.g., introduction and extension of the fixed-rate full allotment policy, introduction of additional liquidity-providing operations) impacted on expectations for the size of central bank reserves and, thus, the spread between policy rates and short-term market rate. The results of our study indicate that such announcements are adequately captured by the path factor.
Secondly, as already discussed, we document changes to the transmission of monetary policy during the period of the crisis. Further work will focus on deepening this analysis, in particular in order to determine whether the transmission of monetary policy to stressed countries returned to a more normal footing during the later part of our sample.
Finally, the richness of our data set allows us to adjust the time window of our analysis in order to more precisely identify when a monetary policy shock is absorbed into financial asset prices. For example, using the entire length of our time window (incorporating the ECB's monetary policy announcement and subsequent press conference), we find that our two factors have no impact on euro area equity prices. However, if we restrict our window to just 30 mintures around the ECB's initial announcement (excluding the press conference), we find that the factor related to the current level of short-term interest rates does have an impact.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature in this area. In Section 3, we present details of our data set and of the methodologies for constructing monetary policy shock measures (rotated factor analysis and recursive regressions) before comparing the results of these methods. In Section 4, we present the results of our analysis on the impact on monetary policy shocks on euro-denominated financial asset prices. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
In the literature, there are currently two dominant methods for identifying monetary policy shocks. 5 The first integrates such shocks into a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis by imposing timing and impact restrictions on the interaction between the central bank policy rate and other financial market or real economy variables (see, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), or Rudebusch (1998)). A second method relies on the use of high frequency data in order to measure the change in money market rates in a short window around monetary policy announcements (see Kuttner (2001) , Hamilton (2008) , and Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012)). The use of such high frequency data allows researchers to address two problems associated with estimating the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial asset prices. Firstly, simultaneity can arise if monetary policy shocks are in fact a response to changes in financial asset prices. Secondly, both monetary policy and financial asset prices could be reacting to another event, such as a data release or a re-pricing of risk by market participants, giving rise to omitted variable bias. Isolating the change in a short window encompassing the communication event reduces the risk of these two types of identification errors leading to biased estimates.
Our paper contributes to this second strand of the literature. A variant of this method places an emphasis on the ability of monetary policy announcements to change market expectations of future short-term rates. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) find that two factors are required to explain the common movement in a range of forward interest rates around a short window encompassing US Federal Reserve interest rate announcements. They rotate these two factors so that one relates to news about the current policy rate while the other relates to news about the future path of policy rates. Brand et al. (2010) undertake a similar analysis for ECB interest rate announcements and also find that two factors are needed in order to explain the common movement of forward interest rates around these announcements. An alternative method proposed by Gürkaynak (2005) uses a series of recursive regressions on Fed Funds futures contracts in order to separate unanticipated policy announcements into three factors: 1) the level of short-term rates; 2) the timing of interest rate announcements; and 3) the future path of interest rates. Brand et al. (2010) and Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2007) propose similar methods that exploit the separate timing of ECB interest rate announcements and press conferences.
The results of such research indicate that monetary policy shocks generally move financial asset prices in the intended direction, although there is less certainty on the magnitude of the change. Much of the literature focuses on the impact on the yield curve. Kuttner (2001) finds that the unanticipated component of Federal Reserve interest rate announcements has a significant impact across the yield curve but that this impact diminishes as maturity increases. In line with the findings of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) for the US, Brand et al. (2010) find that the forward-looking element of ECB communication has a substantial impact on long-term interest rates and that the importance of this component increases with maturity. Similarly, Rosa (2008) finds that the surprise component of Federal Reserve and ECB interest rate announcements have an impact across the respective yield curve and that this impact can be explained by both the interest rate announcement and the content of the accompanying statement. This study also finds that the response of the long-end of the yield curve is significantly larger in the US than in the euro area and that Federal Reserve announcements move euro yields across all maturities to a greater extent than ECB announcements move US dollar yields.
Measurement of Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section we describe the two methods that we use for extracting measures of monetary policy shocks. The first is based on Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) (GSS hereafter) and consists of a latent factor analysis and factor rotation using forward Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates. The second is similar to a methodology described in Gürkaynak (2005) and consists of a series of recursive regressions on forward OIS rates. We compare the results of these two methodologies and discuss developments in euro area monetary policy shocks before and since the onset of the financial market crisis. 6 We do not explore methods based on the sequencing of the ECB's interest rate announcements (i.e., a press release followed by a press conference), such as in Brand et al. (2010) . Such methods rely on an assumption that each part of the announcement process conveys information relating to only one type of monetary policy shock, i.e., current market rates or to future market rates. We do not believe this to be the case. In particular, an unexpected interest rate decision announced via the ECB's press release is likely to also affect expectations for the future path of short-term interest rates.
Data
Our data set consists of the changes in forward OIS 7 rates in a window around the ECB's monthly interest rate announcements and press conferences. We include the 144 scheduled interest rate announcements 8 and 1 unscheduled announcement 9 between 2002 and 2013. We do not include ECB interest rate announcements during the period 1999 to 2002 due to a high level of volatility in our intraday OIS data during this period, likely reflecting a lack of market depth. This can be seen in Figure 1 , which shows the largest minute-onminute change in 12-month OIS rates for each scheduled ECB monetary policy announcement since March 1999.
Forward OIS rates are commonly used as a benchmark for gauging the future path of the EONIA rate. Given the ECB's stated aim of maintaining short-term money market rates close to its main refinancing rate, such forward rates also provide useful information on the future course of monetary policy.
10
It is common for market analysts to adjust forward OIS rates using the dates of forthcoming ECB reserve maintenance periods, thus allowing market participants to observe in real time the average EONIA rate expected to prevail during each period. OIS contracts have a number of advantages over other money market rates for the calculation of such expectations. Notably, the low level of credit risk inherent in interest rate swap contracts, for which the only payment is the net accrued interest payment at the end of the contract, means that rates are not significantly affected by risk premia, even at longer 7 An OIS contract is a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap with the floating leg tied to a daily interbank rate. In the case of euro OIS contracts, this interbank rate is the euro overnight index average (EONIA) rate. The EONIA rate is a weighted average of the interest rates on overnight unsecured transactions for a panel of banks. See Remolona and Wooldridge (2003) for an overview of the euro OIS market.
8 The ECB's Governing Council generally meets twice monthly but only makes an interest rate announcement following the first meeting of the month, which typically takes place on the first Thursday of the month. A decision to not discuss the monetary policy stance at the mid-month meeting was announced by ECB President Duisenberg on 8 November 2001. 9 The ECB announced a 50bps cut in its main refinancing rate on 8 October 2008. This was part of a joint interest rate announcement from a number of central banks. 10 A number of studies document the close relationship between the EONIA rate and the ECB's main refinancing rate prior to the adoption of the ECB's fixed-rate full allotment policy on 8 October 2008. For example, ECB (2008) shows that the spread between the two rates averaged 6bps between March 2004 and December 2007, with a standard deviation of 9bps. During this period, the ECB sought to provide banks with adequate liquidity so that short-term money market rates remained aligned with the main refinancing rate. The relationship between the EONIA rate and the main refinancing rate became more complex after the introduction of the fixed-rate full allotment policy, with the spread depending on factors such as the level of (excess) liquidity held by money market participants and the width of the ECB's standing facility corridor (see Hernandis and Torr (2013) for a discussion). maturities. Our intraday OIS data come from the Thomson Reuters Tick History application. This application gives access to historical high-frequency financial market data for a wide range of asset classes starting in 1996. Our OIS data include all monthly maturities up to 1 year and quarterly maturities between 1 and 2 years (16 series in total). For each maturity, the Thomson Reuters Tick History application provides minute-by-minute bid and ask quotes, which are compiled using quotes from a number of dealers on the market. These data require a seasonally-varying time adjustment from GMT to CET. Calculating mid-quote figures, we construct a number of monthly and quarterly forward OIS rates (detailed below). 11 We make an adjustment to the 1-month OIS rate and the 1-month forward OIS rate in order that they correspond to the EO-NIA rates expected to prevail during the two maintenance periods following the Governing Council decision (see Appendix A for details on this calculation).
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We calculate the difference in each forward rate using 5-minute averages before the start and after the end of a window around the ECB's interest rate announcement and press conference. We define this window as beginning at 13:35 and ending at 15:50, allowing an approximately 10-minute margin on either side of the monetary policy announcement process.
13
As changes in OIS rates during our window can also be affected by other events that occur within the window, we look at the timing of other economic data releases on ECB monetary policy announcement days. The only other significant release that occurs during our time window is the US Initial Jobless Claims report, which is generally released by the US Department of Labor at 14:30 CET, i.e., at the same time as the beginning of the ECB's press conference.
14 We regress the changes in our OIS forward rates on the percentage deviation of the Initial Jobless Claims figure from the median expectation of this figure from a Bloomberg survey of market analysts. We find that this deviation has a statistically significant relationship with a number of our forward OIS rate series. 15 In order to remove the impact of the Initial Claims figures on our OIS forward rates, we replace the forward rates with the residual of the regression described above. 12 This adjustment is only possible from March 2004, when the ECB changed the timing of its reserve maintenance periods so that they would always begin on the settlement date of the first liquidity-providing operation following the Governing Council interest rate decision. Prior to this, interest rate decisions could be taken during reserve maintenance periods, making it difficult to calculate market expectations for future changes to ECB policy rates (see ECB, 2003, for a discussion). We therefore do not adjust the 1-month OIS rate and the 1-month forward OIS rate prior to March 2004. 13 The Governing Council's interest rate decision is announced in the form of a press release at 13:45 CET. The press conference begins at 14:30 CET and generally lasts for slightly longer than one hour. The press conference begins with an Introductory Statement, which is read by the President and subsequently released on the ECB's website. The remainder of the press conference takes the form of a questions and answers session. Press conferences were not held on a small number of the days included in our analysis; we do not adjust the length of our window on these days.
14 Initial Jobless Claims figures were released on 136 of our 145 daily observations. We exclude two of these data points as the release was made at 13:30 CET, i.e., before the start of our time window. The release was made at 15:30 on 3 occasions during our sample. The Bank of England commonly makes a monetary policy announcement on the same day as the ECB but this occurs before the start of our time window (at 13:00 CET). 15 This result is quite interesting in itself, highlighting the impact of US data releases on expectations for euro short-term interest rates and, therefore, the ECB's monetary policy stance. 16 As a robustness test, we also undertake our factor estimation using the unadjusted OIS forwards and find that the Initial Jobless Claims figures have a statistically significant impact on the path factor, described in the next section. Using these unadjusted figures
Latent Factor Analysis and Factor Rotation
This approach is based on the methodology proposed in GSS (2005). We assume that monetary policy announcements are likely to affect expectations of short-term interest rates over an horizon longer than the current month. More formally, we assume that monetary policy announcements at date t influence changes in a set of forward OIS interest rates (adjusted for Initial Jobless Claims announcements) collected in the vector Y t . The key issue is to determine how many latent factors, denoted by F t , are sufficient to adequately capture the impact of these announcements on Y t .
Let Y denote the T × n matrix with rows Y t corresponding to Governing Council dates and columns corresponding to changes in a selection of forward OIS interest rates. Y can be written in the form:
where F is a k × T matrix of latent factors (with k < n), Λ is the matrix of factors loadings, and η is a T × n matrix of white noise residuals. In the following we consider n = 7 and Y = (∆f and f 1 1 we use the date adjustment described in the previous section in order that they correspond to the EONIA rates expected to prevail during the two maintenance periods following the Governing Council.
As in GSS (2005) and Brand et al. (2010), we test the number of factors k using the matrix rank test of Cragg and Donalds (1997, see details in appendix). 17 The null hypothesis states that Y is described by k 0 factors against the alternative hypothesis that Y is described by k > k 0 . This test is applied to three samples: the first covers the whole sample period, the second the "precrisis" period, and the third the "post-crisis" period. We define the pre-and post-crisis periods in function of the ECB's announcement of its fixed-rate full allotment policy on 8 October 2008, shortly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Table 1 reports the results of these tests. For the entire sample and the two sub samples, we cannot reject the hypothesis (at a 5% significance level) that 2 factors are needed in order to explain variation in our set of forwards OIS rates, although we robustly reject the hypothesis of more than two.
would therefore lead us to estimate a path factor that also incorporates the information content of Initial Jobless Claims figures. 17 As in Brand et al. (2010) preference is given to this test rather than the more recent test of Bai and Ng (2002) as the latter requires a much larger column dimension for Y . The factor estimation is performed in two steps. First we estimate the unobserved factors F using the standard method of principal component analysis applied to the data matrix Y, after normalizing each column to have zero mean and unit variance. Based on the results of the tests on the number of factor, we retain the first two factors F 1 and F 2 . These factors are orthogonal and explain a maximum fraction of the variance of Y . Second, as in GSS (2005) and
The two rotated factors, calculated using data from the entire sample, are shown in Figure 2 
Recursive Regressions
Our methodology for measuring monetary policy shocks using recursive regressions is based on Gürkaynak (2005) . 18 We use the change in expectations of EONIA for the two maintenance periods following the interest rate announcement (∆mp1 and ∆mp2) as well as a long-dated forward rate (∆f 18 6 ) in order to estimate three types of monetary policy shock: jump, timing, and path.
The jump shock is simply the change in expectations for the EONIA rate during the second maintenance period following the announcement:
We use the change for the second and not the first maintenance period in order to account for the possibility that market participants expect a change in interest rates but are unsure whether this will occur at the current or the next ECB Governing Council meeting. However, the timing of the interest 18 There are two diferences between our metholdogy and that described in Gürkaynak (2005) . Firstly, in line with the language used in the previous section, we refer to jump and path factors, as opposed to level and slope factors. Secondly, we use a longer-dated forward rate in the estimation of our path factor. rate announcement could still have an impact on very short-term monetary market rates. We account for this timing uncertainty by including a timing factor, which is the residual of the regression of the jump factor on ∆mp1:
Finally, the path factor is the residual of a regression of the jump factor on the change in the long-term forward rate: 
Discussion of Estimated Monetary Policy Shocks
Similar patterns can be observed in our two sets of factors. For example, both of the jump factors show two periods during which markets tended to be surprised by monetary policy announcements: firstly, during the months following the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008 and, secondly, during 2011 when the ECB initially increased interest rates (April and July) and subsequently reduced them again (November and December). It is interesting to note that both of these episodes are in the post-crisis subsample, indicating that the onset of the crisis may have reduced the predictability of euro area monetary policy. This development can be more clearly observed by looking at the evolution of the ECB's HitRate over the full sample. 19 Using the jump factor from the recursive regressions as our measure of the (contemporaneous) monetary policy surprise, this rate equals 1 if the absolute value of the surprise is less than 10bps and 0 if not. Figure 7 shows the forward-looking 12-month moving average of this hit rate. This shows that ECB monetary policy decisions were largely anticipated by market participants prior to the crisis. Turning to the two measures of the path factors, both show some large shocks around the time of the Lehman Brother's bankrutcy but, otherwise, do not show any discernibly different pattern between the pre-and the post-crisis period. Indeed, these factors appears to be quite consistently large throughout the sample period, underlining the importance of this second element to euro area monetary policy announcements. In line with the conclusion of other studies and with the results of our Wald tests, the timing factor from the recursive regression analysis is generally not of a particularly large magnitude, although it also shows some instabilty during the two periods mentioned above.
Assessment of Non-Standard Measures
Our monetary policy shock measures allow us to gauge the announcement effect of the ECB's various non-standard monetary policy measures on the stance of monetary policy. It is important to note, however, that our measures use shifts in the forward OIS curve in order identify changes in the stance of monetary policy. However, certain non-standard monetary policy measures did not impact on these rates but instead sought to act directly on other market interest rates. For example, the ECB's Securities Markets Programme (SMP) targeted the sovereign yields of several euro area countries without seeking to change the overall stance of monetary policy. The impact of such measures cannot, therefore, be captured by our measures of monetary policy shocks.
In this section, we will investigate the impact of two types of non-standard monetary policy measures that can be captured using our shocks: liquidity policies and forward guidance policies. The first category of non-standard measures, liquidity policies, comprises a broad range of policies announced by the ECB over the course of the crisis, including the adoption and extension of the fixed-rate full allotment policy, the introduction of additional liquidity-providing operations, changes to the maturity of these operations, changes to the collateral framework, and the introduction of the additional credit claims (ACC) framework. The impact of this wide range of measures on the monetary policy stance can be captured using the same mechanism: changes to expectations for future levels of excess central bank reserves affecting expectations of the spread between the EONIA rate and the ECB's main refinancing rate and, therefore, forward OIS rates.
A good example of such an impact can be seen on 4 August 2001. While the ECB did not announce any interest rate changes on this day, it announced several liquidity measures:
• A 6-month liquidity-providing operation to be held the following week;
• An extension of the fixed-rate full allotment policy for weekly operations until "at least until the end of the last quarter of 2011";
• A return to fixed-rate full allotment for liquidity-providing operations with a 3-month maturity.
Both of our GSS monetary policy shock factors show a relatively large negative shocks on this day: 10bps for the jump factor and 40bps for the path factor. Figure 8 shows developments in the 30-day OIS rate and the 90-day forward OIS rate in 270 days time on this day, both of which fell over the course of our window. It is noteworthy that while the 30-day OIS rate, covering the upcoming maintenance period, did not change in reaction to the press release (first dotted line), it fell over the course of the press conference. This means that information other than the level of ECB interest rates for this period caused the expected EONIA rate to fall. This most likely relates to the announcements about liquidity policies, which were released over the course of the press conference (second dotted line).
20 Figure 8 also shows that longer-term forward OIS rates also fell on this day, also reflecting changed expectations of liquidity conditions but also possibly incorporating changed expectations for the ECB's future interest rate path. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 9 , falls in forward EONIA rates were largest for the 3-month forward OIS rate in 12 months' time, suggesting that the additional easing from these liquidity measures were expected to start reversing after 15 months.
The second category of non-standard measures, forward guidance, seeks to directly influence economic agents' expectations for the future path of policy rates. The ECB adopted a forward guidance policy on 4 July 2013, with the inclusion of the following language in the President's opening statement at the press conference: "Looking ahead, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. The Governing Council expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time." On this day, our GSS measures show a large negative path factor (14bps) but a small positive jump factor (1bp), suggesting that the 20 The ECB also revealed over the course of the press conference that it had relaunched purchases of sovereign debt under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Uncertainty over whether these operations would be sterilised or not may have also contributed to changes in OIS rates over the course of our window. adoption of forward guidance did indeed lead to an easing of the policy stance. It is not possible to conclude, however, that this large path factor is due entirely to the ECB stating its expectation that rates would remain at low levels for an extended period of time. This is because the ECB simultaneously signalled the possibility of a further lowering its policy rates. It is difficult to disentangle the two elements of this statement, limiting the usefulness of an event study analysis to assess this non-standard measure.
Impact of Shocks on Asset Prices
In this section, we present the results of an analysis of the relationship between our monetary policy shock factors (GSS and recursive regression methods) and financial asset prices. We undertake this analysis using short and long-term sovereign bond rates for the four largest euro area countries, for euro area equity prices, and for the EUR-USD exchange rate. Such an analysis allows us to determine whether one set of factors is superior at explaining variation in these assets prices during our time window. It also allows us to determine whether assets prices reacted differently to measures of monetary policy shocks before and after the onset of the financial market crisis. There are number of common elements to our analysis on different asset prices. Firstly, as our independent variables (GSS and Recursive Regression factors) are constructed measures, we bootstrap the standard errors of our regression coefficients (using 350 repetitions). Secondly, we include the Initial Jobless Claims series in our regression specifications in order to capture the impact that this data release on asset prices. Thirdly, while we include a constant in our regression specifications, we do not report them in our tables. Finally, we exclude the observation for 8 October 2008, i.e., an unscheduled 50bps interest rate cut made in concert with other major central banks. We omit this observation as it is not possible to isolate the impact of the ECB announcement on asset prices on this day as several other central banks announced changed their monetary policy stance at the same time. Furthermore, we observe that sovereign bond rates actually increased in response to this announcement, reflecting the extremely high degree of financial market stress at this time.
Data
Our dataset of sovereign bond and equity prices also consists of minute-byminute intraday data for days of Governing Council meetings from the Reuters Tick History application. The data cleaning process is quite similar to that undertaken for OIS data, including the time adjustment, calculation of midquote figures, and differencing between the start and end of our time window. However, the raw data are tick-by-tick and not minute-by-minute, i.e., data points correspond to the appearance of a new quote from a dealer. This requires the calculation of minute-by-minute averages of our bond yields and equity prices. Furthermore, there are several instances of missing data points at either end of the window. We replace these missing data points with the average of the two adjacent quotes. In the limited number of cases where there are not two adjacent quotes, we leave the data point blank.
Sovereign Bonds
We undertake regression analysis for 2-, 5-and 10-year bond yields for Germany, France, Spain and Italy using the 2 GSS and 3 Recursive Regression factors. Each regression also includes the deviation figure for Initial Jobless Claims and a constant term. In addition to regressions using factors estimated for the entire period, we also present the results of regressions using factors estimated on the pre-crisis and post-crisis sub samples.
The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 2 to 4 . Focusing on the left-hand panel of these tables (regressions using factors estimated over the entire sample), we observe that the 2 sets of factors explain a broadly similar amount of the variation in yields. However, the timing factor from the recursive regressions is only significant in a small number of the 16 regressions and generally only at shorter maturities. This reinforces the results from the Wald tests, which indicate that only two factors are required to explain variation in our set of forward OIS rates. We also observe that both sets of factors explain a progressively smaller part of variation in yields as maturity increases.
The regression results using the entire sample show that our measures of monetary policy shocks explain a much lower proportion of the variation in Spanish and Italian yields across maturities, compared to German and French yields. An explanation for this can be found in the regression results for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The magnitude of the coefficients and the R2s from each regression are largely similar across countries prior to October 2008. This is not, however, the case in the post-crisis period, with our monetary policy shock measures explaining a low proportion of the variation in bond yields for Spain and Italy. The R2s for France and Germany, in contrast, remain similar to the pre-crisis regression results. This highlights the breakdown in the transmission of monetary policy impulses to sovereign yields in Spain and Italy during the post-crisis period. 
Equity Prices
We perform a similar analysis on equity prices, using intraday data for the Eurostoxx 50. Regression results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . None of our monetary policy shock factors have a significant relationship with the change in the Eurostoxx 50 index over the course of our time window. However, by dividing our window into shorter sub-windows, we find that the GSS jump factor and the recursive regression jump and timing factors have an impact on equity prices during a window around the ECB's press release at 13:45 CET (we set this window to be between 13:35 to 14:05). However, neither of the path factors have an impact when we focus on a window surrounding the press conference (14:20 CET to 15:50 CET). These results indicate that the shock component of the ECB's press release is very quickly integrated into equity prices but that the impact is not persistent as prices subsequently react to other news, which we do not capture in our model. The speed of adjustment of equity prices with respect to path shocks may explain why we do not manage to capture the impact of this shock. 
Exchange Rates
Results of regresion of our factors on changes in the EUR/USD exchange rate are shown in Table 7 . These result show that both set of factors explain around 25% of variation in this exchange rate over our time window, with both the jump and path factors being significant. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have used high frequency financial market data in order to measure euro area monetary policy shocks and estimate their impact on financial asset prices in a short window around ECB monetary policy announcements. We have emphasised the two time components of monetary policy shocks: one related to the current level of short-term interest rates (the jump factor) and another related to the expected future path of short-term interest rates (the path factor). In doing so, we have drawn on the work of Gürkaynak et al. (2005) , as well as Gürkaynak (2005) . We confirm that at least two factors are needed to explain changes in OIS rates in a window around ECB monetary policy announcements, both for the periods before and after the onset of the financial market crisis. We find that these two factors explain a large part of the variation in euro area sovereign bond yields during the same time window, although this diminishes as the maturity of bonds increases. We also find that the sovereign bond yields of stressed euro area countries (Spain and Italy in this study) become much less responsive to monetary policy announcements during the period of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, highlighting the breakdown of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in some countries at this time.
A Calculation of EONIA Expectations for Forthcoming ECB Maintenance Periods
Our data set includes market expectations of EONIA rates during the two maintenance periods following ECB interest rate announcements. These expectations are calculated using OIS rates and a count of the number of days in maintenance periods. 21 Given the close relationship between EONIA and the ECB's Main Refinancing Rate, changes in these expectations provide a more precise measure of short-term monetary policy shocks than unadjusted forward rates. Our methodology for constructing these expectations is similar to the one used in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) .
The interest rate on an OIS contract at time t can be seen as a weightedaverage of the daily EONIA rates expected over the course of that contract. If we assume that the EONIA rate is stable over the maturity of a maintenance period and that a 30-day OIS contract can cover a maximum of two maintenance periods 22 , we can express the 30-day OIS rate prior to an ECB interest rate announcement as:
OIS (30) where d1 corresponds to the number of days remaining in the current maintenance period, r 0 is the current EONIA rate, r 1 is the EONIA rate expected to prevail in the next maintenance period, and ρ1 is the risk premium present in the contract. Differencing this equation with the 30-day OIS rate at the end of the announcement window (time t) 23 , we can define the change in r 1 (M P 1) as: M P 1 = (OIS(30) t − OIS(30) t−∆t ) 30 30 − d1 .
A similar methodology is used to calculate the change in the EONIA rate expected to prevail during the second maintenance period following the interest rate announcement. The 30-day forward OIS rate in 30 day's time (f 1 m ) before the interest-rate announcement can be expressed as a weighted average of the expected EONIA rate during the next two maintenance periods: 21 We construct this day count using information published on the ECB's website. 22 In our data set, 5 observations out of a total of 145 do not conform to this second assumption, i.e., the first maintenance period after the interest rate announcement is particularly short and a 30-day OIS contract covers three maintenance periods. We do not adjust our methodology to account for this, leading to a small bias in our calculated expectations on these days. 23 We assume that the risk premium does not change over this period where d2 is the number of days that the forward rate covers during the first maintenance period, E(r2) is the EONIA rate expected to prevail during the second maintenance period, and ρ2 is the risk premium contained in the forward rate. Differencing the forward rates observed before and after the announcement (and assuming a constant risk premium), we can define the change in r 2 (M P 2) as: 
with
The matrix U is identified by the following restrictions:
• Z 1 and Z 2 are orthogonal:
with v 1 = E(F 1 F 1 ) and v 2 = E(F 2 F 2 )
• Z 1 and Z 2 have unit variance:
• Z 2 does not influence ∆M P 1. Let denote γ 1 and γ 2 the loading of ∆M P 1 on F 1 and F 2 , respectively. It follows that:
The system composed by restrictions (5), (6) , (7) and (8) 
